Articles Posted in Contract/Corporate

The stated purpose of the corporation, owned by two shareholders in a 55%-45% split, was to lease residential and commercial space. The corporation owned one building and the majority holder wanted to sell it as part of a §1031 Exchange. The expected return was expected to be 300% over a three year period. The minority shareholder refused, and claimed that a super-majority vote was required to allow the sale.

The court noted that under the Business Corporation Law a super-majority was not required if the corporation was making the sale in the ordinary course of its business as “actually conducted by the corporation in furtherance of the objectives of its existence.” Because both parties agreed that the corporation’s business was to lease property, the court had to determine how the proposed sale fit into the corporation’s ordinary business.

The court held that the corporation was proposing a sale, not an exchange. The minority shareholder argued that the sale of the sole asset was not in the regular business of the corporation. The court disagreed. Because the purpose of the sale was not to liquidate the corporation but to reinvest the sale proceeds in a different property, and to then engage in the corporation’s ordinary business with that new property, no super-majority consent was required.

A few months ago, the First Department appellate court invalidated a $1.13 million loan because it found its charges and interest to violate New York’s criminal usury laws. The interesting facts of this case are worthy of discussion.

In 2009, ASI, a corporation, needed an immediate cash infusion. Blue Wolf, an investment firm, agreed to lend ASI a sum of money while it conducted due diligence and decided whether it would make an equity investment in ASI. The loan documents, executed in January 2010, provided for Blue Wolf to loan ASI $1,130,000 with interest to accrue at 12% per annum. The loan was secured by ASI’s assets. Although not completely clear from the decision, it seems that Blue Wolf could call the loan upon demand. At closing, ASI received only $805,000 because Blue Wolf kept $325,000 as fees and deposits. Those were broken down as a $50,000 commitment fee, a $75,000 deposit against Blue Wolf’s costs and expenses incurred in connection with the loan, and $200,000 was retained by Blue Wolf as a “‘deposit against future commitment fees'” in the event that ASI rolled over the loan into future financing. Even with this fee charged, Blue Wolf was not obligated to advance future funds or even roll over the loaned funds into a new note. Remarkably, the loan terms provided that if new financing was not arranged by March 31, 2010, Blue Wolf was permitted to keep all or part of the $200,000 as “‘compensation for [Blue Wolf’s] time and expenses, as determined by [Blue Wolf] in its sole discretion.'”

Blue Wolf admitted that by January 2010, it had decided that it would not purchase any portion of ASI and would not provide further financing. Blue Wolf called the loan in March 2010, claiming a loss of confidence in ASI, and informed ASI that it would keep half of the $200,000 it retained. ASI did not repay the loan, and in May 2010, Blue Wolf again demanded repayment, and informed ASI that it would now keep the entire $200,000. When ASI did not pay, Blue Wolf began the foreclosure process against ASI’s assets, as a secured lender. Because of a defect in the March notice, Blue Wolf notified ASI in July 2010 that it would accept ASI’s assets in lieu of repayment of the loan. In July and August 2010, ASI paid Blue Wolf $54,000. Blue Wolf rejected those payments claiming that it had foreclosed on ASI’s assets, which ASI was then holding for Blue Wolf’s benefit. Blue Wolf offered to sell those assets back to ASI for $1.3 million and apply the $54,000 toward that purchase price.

Defendant failed to complete eight bridesmaids dresses until two hours after the ceremony was scheduled to begin, when they were delivered by the groom. As a result of this delay, plaintiff incurred a host of delays for which she incurred expenses, including a delay in the bride’s appearance from the rented limousine, so as not to break the tradition of not being seen by the groom or guests before the ceremony. For these expenses, the court awarded plaintiff damages. However, for the wedding parties’ inability to have pictures taken in the scenes scheduled and for the bridesmaids wearing different clothing in different pictures, no award would be made as no amount could be reasonably fixed as damages for these items. The court also rejected damages for emotional distress, finding that plaintiff “failed to meet the high threshold required in proving” this claim because defendant’s failure to deliver the dresses was “not so outrageous in character and extreme in degree that it exceeds all bounds tolerated by a decent society which is of a nature calculated to cause, and does cause, serious mental distress.”

The last time we wrote on this topic, a group of plaintiffs’ had their $900 million claim thrown out by a judge, essentially because the plaintiffs had stuck their head in the sand and did not investigate red flags evident in a transaction. In Pappas v. Tzolis, it was a paltry claim of just a few million that was tossed, but the underlying facts and legal principals were the same. Interestingly, it was again the selling party, the one which many believe to have less risk than the buyer, that came up holding the very short end of the stick.

The facts here are as follows: Pappas and Tzolis (and one other) formed a LLC to lease property. Tzolis personally provided the lease deposit of almost $1.2 million and was permitted to sublet the property. The parties also agreed that they had other business and could compete with the LLC or other members without notice. Trouble surfaced when Tzolis subleased the property to a company he controlled for $20,000 above the LLC’s monthly payment. Unhappy with that, Pappas claimed that Tzolis prevented the LLC from leasing it directly for a higher rent, and that Tzolis was generally frustrating the lease interest of the LLC. Shortly thereafter, Tzolis bought out the other members, including Pappas. At the closing, Pappas signed a document attesting to the facts that prior to his sale of his membership interest, he had done his own due diligence using his own lawyers, and was not relying on any representation made by Tzolis or upon their relationship as co-members of the LLC. After the transaction closed, Tzolis assigned the lease interest from his entity to a third-party for $17.5 million.

Pappas sued Tzolis claiming that Tzolis had lined up this sublease before the membership interest were transferred, in violation of his fiduciary obligations to him as a member of the LLC. Had he known, argued Pappas, he would not have agreed to sell for the price that he did. The lower court threw out the case, but parts of it, including the fiduciary claim, were reinstated by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals, reversed the Appellate Division and threw out the case.

A few months ago, the Court of Appeals highlighted the pitfall of a not uncommon scenario, that of experienced and sophisticated business people relying on the representations of others but which are later found to be less than truthful. In Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V., the court dismissed the fraud claims of former shareholders of a Latin American mobile telephone company because those shareholders ignored obvious concerns that arose in the course of the sale of their shares that should have put them on notice of potential problems. Not only were those issues not addressed, but those shareholders released the company and remaining shareholders from liability in connection with the sale. The outcome of this case underlines the fact that experienced and sophisticated parties must do their own due diligence no matter what they are told.

The facts are somewhat complicated but can be summarized as follows: Plaintiffs held a majority interest in an Ecuadorian company which sought funding from a Mexican company, Telemex Mexico, controlled by billionaire Carlos Slim. The funding was provided and a new entity was formed which was owned by the plaintiffs and Telemex. The parties agreed that in the event that there were additional transfers to different entities, plaintiffs could swap their interest from the old entity to the new entity on terms to be agreed. Following a subsequent transfer, plaintiffs tried to negotiate the terms for the transfer of their ownership interest into the new entity. Encountering resistance from Telemex, plaintiffs opted to just sell their interest outright and did not receive any interest in the new entity.

Eight years later, plaintiffs sued claiming to have been defrauded. Plaintiffs claimed that they were given incomplete and bogus information of the new entity’s value. Had they known the true state of affairs, they alleged, they would have forced a transfer or sold their interests at a far higher price. Under the agreement by which plaintiffs sold their interests, they agreed to release the other shareholders and the new entity from any claims in connection with the agreement. The remaining shareholders and their entities also provided plaintiff with no warranties related to the business’ state of affairs.

In the normal course of events, two parties that enter into a contract are obligated to perform in accordance with that contract. Where a party fails to do so that party has breached the contract and will ordinarily be liable for any resulting damage to the other, non-breaching party. Although in most cases only the breaching party can be liable, there are limited scenarios where others may be liable as well. This article will discuss situations where a third- party that is not a party to the breached contract can also be liable to the non-breaching party. This third-party’s liability is based on its improper interference with an existing contract, known as tortious interference with an existing contract.

Before discussing the details of this claim and liability, it is important to understand that courts will generally sanction and encourage legitimate business competition. Courts will not penalize a third-party’s ordinary attempts to solicit business, even when doing so may result in the breach of a contract between two other parties. Therefore, the fact that a party to a contract breached that contract to respond to the solicitations of a third- party, does not automatically create liability for that third-party. As discussed below, the conduct of the third-party in soliciting the business often determines whether its conduct was proper.

For example, Tire Supply, Inc., has an exclusive contract to sell tires to Tire Depot, Inc., for $10 a tire. The agreement provides that Tire Supply may sell to no one other than Tire Depot and Tire Depot may purchase tires only from Tire Supply. Tire Meddler Corp., approaches Tire Supply and offers to buy all of its tires for $12 a tire, $2 more than Tire Supply receives from Tire Depot. Selling to Tire Meddler will require that Tire Supply breach and terminate its agreement with Tire Depot. Assuming that Tire Supply agrees to sell to Tire Meddler, and breaches its contract with Tire Depot, and is sued by Tire Depot for that breach, can Tire Depot sue Tire Meddler for causing Tire Supply to breach their agreement? Has Tire Meddler done anything legally wrong considering that from a strict business point of view, Tire Meddler did nothing more than offer Tire Supply a better deal?

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